The European market with a 2005 GDP of 12

Imagine a vital region of the world on which the US military would have a cross. Regardless what happens there, say generals, it does us no interest. Unlikely The American political leaders for Economic Affairs International are forced to operate exactly in this way.

Because they are confronted with the very particular approach of the Bush administration with the international regulations. Whether the dossiers for the protection of the consumer or climate change, it can be summed up simply to a laconic "it is a bad idea," regardless of the case. What American politicians do not understand, is that even in the absence of an American voice on the issue of the day, the regulation will eventually prevail.

The American negotiators have created a vacuum and the European Union is ready to complete. Hence the embarrassing result of a regulation which should not be "made in USA" but that will have to when even be adopted by the United States and their businesses.

Start of a basic principle of common sense: the regulation must be judged on its results. In some cases, the world needs more and better rules. Conversely, in other cases, alleviate them can have a beneficial effect. The vast majority of countries in the world gradually adopt this pragmatic view of things.

Unfortunately, this is not the case of the United States, where regulation is practically considered a poorly high thing. The Bush spurred by pressure groups and a Republican majority in the highly ideological Congress is determined to be based on one principle: minimize government intervention, in areas as diverse as the antitrust, environmental or consumer protection.

This situation reflects the political convictions of the administration as well as those of a part of the American business world. But it is used less and less the interests of American power in the world.

The Bush administration can of course leave the assumption that the rules as an instrument of a policy must be put at the disposal. However, disputes about chemicals, genetically modified foods and the protection of data precisely focused on differences and nuances between regulatory regimes.

Many cases which demonstrated the close relationship between business, trade and regulation. A few years ago, the rejection by the European Union of the GE-Honeywell merger catapulted these complex issues on the American newspapers. As was later the fines imposed by the European Commission to Microsoft for its abuse of dominant position.

But even in this very tense atmosphere, the United States do not always appear ready to make the necessary concessions in any serious regulatory negotiation. Record after record, they prefer to stay away from the table of negotiations rather than commit. The Bush administration has an easy answer to this.

If we refuse to negotiate, believe, the regulation at the global level will be. But it is more likely that the things are different. If the United States committed not actively in discussions, primarily with Europe, to shape the global regulatory regime, American ideas will simply not heard.

To test the validity of his own assumptions, perhaps should the administration consider its own doomsday scenario that would see the global regulatory regime entirely decided by the Europeans. This may be closer to the reality that the President's advisers think.

The European market, with a 2005 GDP of 12.200 billion, is almost equivalent to that of the United States (12.400 billions of dollars based on purchasing power parity). Multinational corporations will therefore not ignore it on the pretext that the regulation is too expensive. They go to instead adopt its rules.

American consumers and, in many cases, companies themselves eventually will ask that the United States adopt similar rules. Consumers ask because they will have the eyes the European example and its benefits. For their part, companies will similarly because the price to operate in two different regulatory regimes is too high. The global standard will become, de facto, which was decided in the framework of the European Commission. A condition, of course, that Europeans can convince the third power, Asia.

No chance, according to us strategists, who are convinced for years that their strategy of blocking the Kyoto agreements operated by the inertia of the India and China. The problem is that in Asia the Japan aligns most with Europe on regulatory issues.

And China, faced a nightmare at the level of the environment, has no choice but to take action in this area. The India also cannot afford to ignore these pressures. Ultimately, powerful sovereign America must adopt standards that will be mostly of European origin.

Is the price justified for a nation whose Government is so ideologically determined to abandon the regulatory field to others. European politicians, accustomed to years of American dominance in the area of regulation, have a historical and unhoped-for chance.

Apparently, the United States is a superpower full of good intentions but which also voluntarily than surprisingly abdicated its role.