Economists complain that the g20 is not seized of the problem

Intervention, Wednesday, the Bank of Japan to counter the appreciation of the yen shows a total lack of international cooperation in the field of exchange rates. Despite multiple political declarations on the reality of international cooperation at the highest level, the Japanese unilateral action proves the contrary. Tokyo would have been otherwise well wrong is to deprive, most Governments acting in the same way. The time of general mobilization at the climax of the economic and financial crisis indeed seems to have lived. At the national level, the highest political leaders do not hide their bitterness. "Benign neglect" for the value of the dollar, despite the age-old "a strong dollar is in the interest of the United States" of the American administration at Chinese intransigence against any rapid revaluation of its currency through the Japan willing to weaken its currency against any logic without forgetting the European cacophony on the desirable level of the euro, each defends its own interests. The Waltz of the currencies remains ever more topical and beggar prevails. Only a major risk of general destabilization of the monetary system international would be able to cause a new general mobilization.

For the time being, there is therefore more pilot in the aircraft. But several. Historically, relations between major currencies were regularly mentioned in the summits of the G7, whether at the level of Finance Ministers and Central Bank or the heads of State Governors. We remember the agreements of the Plaza, in September 1985, where the United States, the Japan, the Germany, the United Kingdom and the France decide together down the course of the dollar against the yen and the deutsche Mark. Or the Louvre agreements, two years later, when the United States, the Japan, the Germany, the France, the United Kingdom and the Canada operate again to stop, this time, declining dollar. Last cooperation on exchange rates, more limited, will the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve to support the euro in September 2000. Since then, more concerted intervention was developed implemented for correcting currency imbalances. And for good reason. The emergence of new economic giants, China in the lead, complicates the task.

G8 leaders can now decide alone to manage the international monetary system. The financial and economic crisis have radically changed the landscape, the G8 has lost its prerogatives in favour of a larger club, the g-20. The Summit of the heads of State of the G20 in Pittsburgh in September 2009 thus officially commissioned it as a "priority forum for international economic cooperation". Except that in this expanded forum, exchange rate matters are dealt with in the tip of the lips if not blocked. Certainly, the last Summit in Toronto, June 20, well said the problem of the Exchange. But in terms watered down. Leaders have pledged only to "increase the flexibility of the exchange rates to reflect the fundamentals underlying the economy" and regretted "excessive volatility" and "a disorderly variation in exchange rates", prejudicial to the economic and financial stability. It is little. Economists complain that the g-20 is not seized of the problem. Last Tuesday, the Conference of the United Nations for trade and development (UNCTAD), in a report on trade and development, emphasized that "the time of intense cooperation international appear was belong to the past". And to add that the process initiated in 2006 by China, the United States, the euro area, the Japan and Saudi Arabia to reduce global trade imbalances, including by adjustment of exchange rates, is a failure. None of the policies that led to the emergence of these imbalances has been modified. In this context, the opportunity to attend an overhaul of the international monetary system and an intense cooperation in the field of exchange rate are minimal. The less, as long as there is not an internationally recognized arbitrator to force one or more countries to review his or their Exchange and trade strategy.

A strengthening of the powers of the g-20 and the international monetary Fund (IMF) in the matter is more than desirable. It is even possible. In the origin of the IMF articles, the first article stipulates that the aims of the Fund are, inter alia, to "facilitate the expansion and the harmonious growth of international trade" and "promoting the stability of the Exchange, to maintain between the Member States of exchange rate regimes ordered and to avoid competitive depreciations Exchange". Therefore, why not give the IMF legitimacy first under the eye of the G20 to avoid any overflow of exchange rates Why it not be with the reserves of the central banks of the g-20 a common fund managed by the IMF and that would have the purpose to intervene massively on the market of the Exchange on a currency whose value depart level considered desirable on the evolution of the balance of trade the issuer country of this currency The logic would like to. The practice probably decide otherwise. Unfortunately.